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REEDINGS . . .
Notes on Books by Gerard Reed
November 2003
Number One Hundred Forty-three
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WAR AGAINST TERRORISM
One of the
nation’s finest and most able scholars, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Professor of
Social and political Ethics at The University of Chicago, provides helpful
perspectives on our nation’s role in the Middle East in Just War Against
Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World (New York:
Basic Books, c. 2003). Prodded
to write after
America
’s
attack by Muslim terrorists, Elshtain defends President Bush’s response,
especially when seen in the light of Osama bin Laden’s 1998 declaration of
war against
America
,
[entitled] “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders (p. 3).
Unlike many naive folks in the West, bin Laden declares that the
current conflict is at heart a religious struggle, a rekindling of a battle
that has waxed and waned since Mohammed launched his conquests in 622 A.D.
Summing up bin
Laden’s agenda a Yale historian, Donald Kagan, has written:
“he and other terrorists have made it clear that the
U.S.
is ‘the great Satan,’ the enemy of all they hold dear.
And what these terrorists hold dear includes the establishment of an
extreme and reactionary Muslim fundamentalism in all currently Muslim lands,
at least which is a considerable portion of the globe.
Such a regime would impose a totalitarian theocracy that would
subjugate the mass of people, especially women. . . .
No change of American policy, no retreat from the world, no repentance
for past deeds or increase of national modesty can change these things.
Only the destruction of
America
and its way of life will do, and Osama bin Laden makes no bones about this”
(p. 85).
As a careful
philosopher, Elshtain draws important distinctions between the terrorism of
bin Laden the just war tradition
that has developed in Christian theology.
Islamic Jihad bears
many of the marks of terror! There
is a striking similarity between the “reign of terror” orchestrated by the
Jacobins in
France
in the 1790s and the policies of Moslem jihadists.
Elshtain grasped this when she attended a conference in
Jerusalem
in 1993 and heard a distinguished scholar, Bassam Tibi, explain that:
“[The] Western distinction between just and unjust wars linked to
specific grounds for war is unknown in Islam.
Any war against unbelievers, whatever its immediate ground, is morally
justified. Only in this sense can
one distinguish just and unjust wars in Islamic tradition.
When Muslims wage war for the dissemination of Islam, it is a just war.
. . . When non-Muslims attack
Muslims, it is an unjust war. The
usual Western interpretation of jihad as a “just war” in the Western sense
is, therefore, a misreading of this Islamic concept (emphasis mine)”
(p. 131). Islamic jihad is
simply a religious version of might-makes-right aggression.
Wars of conquest, waged to expand and install Islam, are just wars; terror tactics,
so long as they advance the cause of Islam, are defensible.
The Muslim world is ever at war with the non-Muslim world.
The just war
tradition, conversely, has ever sought to distinguish between moral and
immoral conduct. Given human
sinfulness, there is a need for government, whose primary responsibility is to
protect people. Thus laws, judges,
police, and soldiers are necessary to maintain order and punish evil-doers.
Early Christians, especially Augustine, accepted this and provided
guidelines for Christians to follow in supporting the political order.
Elshtain rightly dismisses the historical errors of those who argue
that the
Early
Church
was pacifist, indicating that the primary advocates of this position were
theologians like Origin and Tertullian “who fell outside the Christian
mainstream” (p. 51). (In fact,
soldiers were admired sufficiently to justify branding model Christians
milites Christi, soldiers for Christ!)
“Jesus preached no doctrine of universal benevolence.
He showed anger and issued condemnations.
These dimensions of Christ’s life and words tend to be overlooked
nowadays as Christian concentrate on God’s love rather than God’s justice.
That love is sometimes reduced to a diffuse benignity that is then
enjoined on believers. This kind
of faith descends into sentimentalism fast” (p. 100).
Following the
admirably non-sentimental Augustine, Christian thinkers formulated the just
war position, convinced that “To save the
lives of others, it may be necessary to imperil and even take the lives of
their tormenters” (p. 57). Careful
criteria were enumerated over the centuries and attained something of a
consensus in virtually all branches of Christendom.
The late Reinhold Niebuhr, arguably the most influential American
ethicist of the 20th century, was “hardheaded [in his] insistence
that Christianity is not solely a religion of love” (p. 109), showing that
love and justice ever work together in solid Christian ethics.
Thus, Elshtain
wonders: “is the war against terrorism just?”
After examining the evidence, she responds:
yes it is! There are, of
course, thousands of Elshtain’s colleagues in the academy and pundits in the
press who say no! They resemble,
she thinks, the “humanists” portrayed in Albert Camus’s novel The
Plague. Such folks refuse to judge
things in terms of black and white—all is a fuzzy mixture of gray.
There are many sides to every question and every conclusion must be
tentative. Their talk, their
terms, their preferences--but not discomfiting realities--define their world.
Consequently, they “are unwilling or unable to peer into the heart of
darkness. They have banished the
word evil from their
vocabularies. Therefore, it cannot
really exist. Confronted by people
who mean to kill them and to destroy their society, these well-meaning persons
deny the enormity of what is going on” (pp. 1-2).
So, when Ronald Reagan called the U.S.S.R. an “evil empire” a
chorus of criticism was unleashed against him.
When George Bush labeled
Iraq
,
Iran
,
and
North Korea
“an axis of evil,” the same singers united in denouncing him.
In fact, the
mark of the modern academic is negativity!
Criticizing, finding fault, disagreeing with traditional views, earns
one a seat in the faculty lounge.
As one experienced professor noted, “You don’t get tenure by
praising American policy” (p. 88). In
most American universities, professors retain their anti-Vietnam War stance,
ever questioning the legitimacy of the military and condemning
America
’s
power in the world. They seem
trapped in a strange time-warp, unable to see the world apart from their
youthful anger at the
Vietnam
engagement. Thus you find
professors alleging that America’s foreign policy is “fascist” and
historian Mary Beard actually insisting that “the United States had it
coming” when the terrorists attacked the nation on 9/11 (p. 93).
Something of the
same marks mainline churches. In a
chapter entitled “the pulpit responds to terror,”
Elshtain demonstrates the degree to which American clergy share the
leftism of the academy, for “a position best described as ‘pseudo’ or
‘crypto’ pacifism now dominates, certainly from our mainline pulpits”(p.
112). Such preachers state the
9/11 devastation was less a murderous attack upon innocent people than a
“wake-up call” for us Americans who need to examine ourselves and change
our ways, to eliminate the “root causes” of terrorist anger.
A prominent evangelical, Tony Campolo (never one to allow historical
ignorance to temper his rhetoric), as well as former President Bill Clinton,
harked back to the Crusades, suggesting that Muslim terrorists were simply
avenging the evils their ancestors suffered at the hands of Christian
Crusaders. Campolo and Clinton, of
course, seemed often mute when confronted with the far greater numbers of
Christians who have been slaughtered and enslaved as a result of Islamic
Jihad!
Significantly, Albert Camus, in a 1948 statement, insisted that the
“Christian has many obligations, and that the world today needs Christians
who remain Christians.” Camus
professed that he did not share the Christian hope.
But he did share “the same revulsion from evil” (p. 123).
Elshtain clearly prefers the atheist Camus to the sentimental
Christians, arguing that when confronting Terrorisism we must have the courage
to both denounce and actively oppose it.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Immediately
following
September 11, 2001
,
one of the nation’s premier military historians, Victor Davis Hanson, wrote
a series of articles that provided Americans historical and analytical
insights with which to put things in perspective.
Those essays have been collected and published as An Autumn of War:
What America Learned from September 11 And the War on Terrorism
(
New
York
: Anchor Books, c. 2002).
“At the very outset,” he says, “I was convinced that September 11
was a landmark event in American history, if not the most calamitous day in
our nation’s 225 years” (p. xiii). In
response, “we must be retold that we war to remember the dead, to save the
innocent, and to end the violence” (p. 12).
We must
understand the Muslim threat, which Hanson thinks is primarily a reaction
against the West’s economic and military success in the
Middle
East
.
Islamists hate
Israel
primarily because “Israelis have defeated Muslims on the battlefield
repeatedly, decisively, at will, and without modesty” (p. 195).
Even more, the very existence of
Israel
illustrates “that it is a nation’s culture--not its geography or size or
magnitude of its oil reserves--that determines its wealth or freedom” (p.
195). Similarly, the
United
States
, both as
Israel
’s
ally and as the world’s foremost example of a successful modern society,
incurs Muslim wrath. “The
Taliban, the mullahs of
Iran
,
and other assorted fundamentalists despise the
United
States
for its culture
and envy it for its power” (p. 15). We
should have heeded early alarms, such as the PBS documentary, American Jihad,
and intelligence reports that showed the rapid growth of terrorists
rather openly operating in the
United
States
during the
1990s. Taking advantage of the
freedoms--and frequently generosity--of their host country, they malignantly
awaited opportunities to destroy her.
Importantly,
Hanson says, weakness--even the voluntary weakness of pacifism--never copes
with the systemic hatred that fuels radical Muslims.
Long ago the Greeks decided that war, though often horrendous, was at
times necessary to destroy evil powers and preserve civilization.
Today, if we understand the world, we must understand what we really
are fighting for—“preserving Western civilization and its uniquely
tolerant and human traditions of freedom, consensual government, disinterested
inquiry, and religious and political tolerance” (p. 73).
Only military power can do this. “It
is an iron law of war that overwhelming military superiority, coupled with
promises to the defeated of resurrection, defeats terrorists--in the past,
now, always--whether they be zealots, dervishes, or Ghost dancers” (p. 155).
But he wonders
if we have the will to empower the military to do the same today.
Americans responded to
Pearl
Harbor
, in 1941, with an anger and
resolve that enabled them to support military action, despite horrendous
battles, such as that at
Okinawa
,
where kamikaze attacks destroyed 34 American ships and 12,000 servicemen died.
Folks at home wept, but they never marched in the streets demanding an
end to the war. Following the 9/11
attacks on
New
York
and
Washington
,
however, many Americans seemed more fearful of offending Muslims’ feelings
than responding with strength to their assault.
As was evident
in
Vietnam
,
“One of the first casualties of war is language” (p. 75).
This is often true of those who wage it, but it also distinguishes many
of those how oppose it. Hanson
pointedly condemns those American university professors who posture and
pontificate while undercutting their nation’s morale.
Having taught at
Fresno
State
University
for two decades, he anticipated that his colleagues would protest any military
response to terrorism, such as the attack upon
Afghanistan
.
The ordinary working class people he knows (in addition to teaching
Hanson farms his family farm) supported President Bush’s response.
But “nearly all of the opposition to our conduct in this war was
expressed by professors and those in law, the media, government, and
entertainment, who as a general rule lead lives rather different from those of
most Americans” (p. xvii). This
elite tenth of the population, dominating “the media, the university,
politics, foundations, churches, and the arts--is adamantly and vocally at
odds with most Americans” (p. 92). Anti-war
protesters, marching in the streets and urged on by folks in classrooms and
churches imagine “peace” comes through appeasement.
The courage of Churchill, the toughness of an earlier
America
,
seems absent in too many sectors.
Though some
anti-war rhetoric appeals to an authentic Christian conscience, Hanson argues
that it is secular, humanistic pacifists, including the “deviant offspring
of the Enlightenment--Marxists and Freudians--[that] gave birth to even more
pernicious social sciences that sought to ‘prove’ to us that war was
always evil and therefore--with help from Ph.D.s--surely preventable” (p.
66). Consequently:
“Pacifists shamed us into thinking that all wars were bad, relativism
convinced us that we are no different from our enemies, conflict resolution
and peace studies hectored us that there was no such thing as a moral armed
struggle of good against evil” (p. 98), and the nation’s elite chattered
about a principled policy of appeasement.
Hanson reminds us of the intelligentsia’s penchant to distort the truth
to serve its own ends. Remember
Vietnam
!
American soldiers fought well, but the war was lost when the people lost
the will to support it. Yet the
truth was rarely told. “At the
so-called bloodbath at
Hue
,
the U.S. Marines lost 147, killed over 5,000 of the enemy, and freed the city in
the worst street-fighting since the Korean War.
The siege of Khe Sahn was an enemy failure and resulted in 50 communist
dead for each American lost. In the
horrific Tet offensive, a surprised American military inflicted 40,000
fatalities upon the attackers while losing fewer than 2,000" (p. 20).
Watching Walter Cronkite on CBS--or listening to Peter Arnett’s
fabrications on CNN--in those years, however, one would never have guessed that
Americans were prevailing in the struggle for
Vietnam
.
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Much that Victor
Davis Hanson says in his essays grows out of his study of military history.
Carnage and Culture; Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power (
New
York
:
Doubleday, c. 2001) illustrates the scholarship and analytical skill he brings
to the discussion. Importantly, as
he admits, his “interests are in the military power, not the morality of the
West” (p. xv), and there is little of the Christian concern for “just war”
principles in the book. He mainly
argues that the citizen soldiers of the West, for a variety of sound reasons,
have proved militarily superior to tribal warriors (such as Shanka Zulu),
mercenaries (such as
Hannibal
’s
corps), and despot’s conscripts (from Darius’ Persians to Japanese
aviators). “Warriors are not
necessarily soldiers” (p. 446).
The famed Greek
physician Hippocrates’ perceptive observation wears well:
“Now where men are not their own masters and independent, but are ruled
by despots, they are not really militarily capable, but only appear to be
warlike. . . . For men’s souls are
enslaved and they refuse to run risks readily and recklessly to increase the
power of somebody else. But
independent people, taking risks on their own behalf and not on behalf of
others, are willing and eager to go into danger, for they themselves enjoy the
prize of victory. So institutions
contribute a great deal to military valor” (Airs, Waters, Places {16, 2}).
Hanson begins
his book with an examination of the Greeks’ victory over the Persians at
Salamis
in 480 B.C. The numerical odds
certainly favored Xerxes’ forces, but one thing enabled the Greeks to prevail:
personal freedom, eleutheria, something unknown elsewhere in antiquity.
“No Greek citizen could be arbitrarily executed without a trial.
His property was not liable to confiscation except by vote of a
council,” and to the Greek “the ability to hold property freely . . . was
the foundation of freedom” (p. 36). At
Salamis
,
the Greeks were not merely resisting a despot’s designs, they were struggling
to secure their most absolute moral values.
Free people, as Herodotus emphasized, “are better warriors, since they
fight for themselves, their families and property, not for kings, aristocrats,
or priests. They accept a greater
degree of discipline than either coerced or hired soldiers” (p. 47).
A century later Aristotle noted: “Infantrymen of the polis think it is
a disgraceful thing to run away, and they choose death over safety through
flight. On the other hand, hired
soldiers, who rely from the outset on superior strength, fell as soon as they
find out they are outnumbered, fearing death more than dishonor” (Nichomachean
Ethics {3.1116b16-23}).
Thus began the
West=s military tradition fully evident in republican
Rome
’s
legions. “The Roman republican
army was not merely a machine. Its
real strength lay in the natural elan of the tough yeoman infantry of
Italy
,
the hard-nosed rustics who voted in the local assemblies of the towns and demes
of
Italy
and were every bit as ferocious as the more threatening-looking and larger
Europeans to the north. In the
tradition of constitutional governance . . . the Romans had marshaled a nation
of free citizens-in-arms” (p. 118). In
fact, the Romans transformed the Greek’s allegiance to the polis and developed “the concept of nation:
Romanness” that extended beyond the barriers of race and geography.
In time, Roman citizenship could be attained and enjoyed throughout the
world by those who were willing to assent to and abide by its provisions.
As Hanson catalogues subsequent world-shaping battles at
Poitiers
,
Tenochtitlan
,
Lepanto, and Midway, it becomes clear that a free people--and only the West
granted such freedom--almost always prevails against totalitarian regimes.
Economic freedom, for example, provides the wealth that ultimately
translates into superior weapons.
The final
chapter deals with the Vietnam war, with the Tet offensive as the focus.
Hanson demonstrates that the American military fought well and could have
won the war. But the media
systematically distorted the truth concerning the war, exaggerating American
atrocities and refusing to report far greater Viet Cong atrocities, manipulating
the public to support an essentially socialistic agenda.
So too dissenters at home--Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda, David Halstrom and
Noam Chomsky--helped jaundice the nation concerning the war’s conduct and
prospects. These folks, of course,
turned their backs on the millions who were liquidated by Communists when the
U.S.
withdrew from
Southeast Asia
in the 1970s.
Broad in its
scope, Carnage and Culture
provides a thoughtful and readable overview of military history, certainly a
significant segment of man’s past.